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The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's report for Calendar Year
1977 was given to Dr. Robert A. Frosch, Admtnistrator of NASA, on
October 12, 1977 at a formal briefing which was open to the public.
The material was update4 to February 1978 in testimony by the Panel
to the Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, chaired
by Senator Adlai E. Stevenson. Hence, the transcripts of these two
meetings (Appendices A and B) represent the Panel's report on its
1977 work and will form the basis of this written report. This , pro-
cedure differs from that used in past reports and documents a more
timely Panel interaction with NASA and the Congress. We expect to
continue in 1978 with two public meetings to report to our constitu-
ency and then submit a record document in early 1979.
Recent Panel reports have been divided into two parts, the
second volume of which was the data received by the Panel in its
various meetings and briefings. In that this material duplicates
that freely available In the Panel staff files or in NASA and its
contractors' files we have decided that it will. be  more effective to
list only the various Panel and fact-finding meetings that have oc-
curred during the year, with date and place of the meetings, and a
summary of the material covered (hppendix C). This procedure will
allow retrieval of the data upon request and at the same time produce
a more readable report.
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During the course of the year the Panel has been almost exclu-
sively concerned with the Space Shuttle. However, at the end of
1977 we f tepared to investigate some of NASA's non-space activities
that have significant safety implications. Our 1978 report is expected
to reflect this activity. We will continue our policy of bi-monthly
formal meetings with fact-finding scheduled for the intervening months
and are turning a portion of our attention to the area of Shuttle pay-
loads.
During 1977 there were a number of events that caused delays
and changes in the Shuttle program, but the Panel feels the signifi-
cance of the successful approach and landing tests should not be
underestimated as a positive indication of the basic state of the
aerodynamic qualities of the aircraft and the modeling and analytical
work that went into the Orbiter design and particularly its control
system. This test program exercised the Orbiter in its unpowered
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final landing mode. 7"he tests uncovered minor problems which could be
fixed without change to the basic design concepts and, more importantly,
they ,provided a demonstration of the adequacy of the Orbiter design and
in the quality of the modeling and analysis on which the design was
Based. Wile this does not directly verify the eventual orbit l flight
performance, Lt lends credence to the analysis methods by which new
problems can be approached with a degree of confidence not before justi-
fied.
The various concerns expressed by the Panel members at its public
meeting are distributed through the transcripts and are summarized here
for clarity. We should preface this by saying that the Panel is well
satisfied by the NASA programmatic responses to its comments. During
the course of the investigations we confer with the concerned people
and develop an understanding of the technical depth leading to designs
and test decisions. The resultant clarification in many cases relieves
a Panel concern. The Panel's critique is believed to be objective and
safely-oriented and is not constrainer: or influenced by the Shuttle
program budgets and schedule. For this reason we do not expect that the
program will implement all specific suggemtions but will seek solutions
that can be fit more easily into the program. The Panel's goal is to
bring different viewpoints to the attention of the program directors to
insure that all aspects of any problem are considered and to assure that
any accepted risk is fully evaluated before it is assumed. The Panel is
an advisory body, not a decision-making one.
During the year we were asked several times for our opinion on
the readiness of the Orbiter for various phases of the ALT program.
On all occasions we were of the opinion that the Orbiter was ready for
flight.
In the Panel's review of the various aspects of the Shuttle pro-
gram one caution is continually sounded: the necessary testing to
establish confidence must not be slighted because of budget or schedule;
pressures. The budget and schedule are tight and pressure to reduce
the number of planned tasks is inevitable e,-,nd must be resisted. In
light of this it is necessary to identify those test programs that are
mandatory and make provision to see that they get done. Areas where
thie is particularly important are those which confirm Avionics software,
mafn engine reliability, flight control systems (particularly the non-
redundant elements) and the t4ormal protection system,
The Panel feels that as the Shuttle matures it will become a
transport aircraft and that the design philosophies of that industry
regarding redundancy of flight controls and concepts to achieve "fail
operational" systems should be incorporated wherever possible, We
acknowledge the problems of making changes at this time, but an indepen-
dent review of the control system vulnerability to specific failures
may well be in order.
A method of identifying and quantifying aggregate risk should be
developed if at all practicable. It is not easy to get a meaningful
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numerical answer to this problem. The Panel has been working with
the reliability and quality assurance groups and some headway is
being made. The work should continue and should include specific
detailed engineering input regarding potential subsystem failure
modes.
The Avionics system used in the landing tests was adequate,
but orbital flight control is more complex and will utilize a differ-
ent comp ;Mkrer. It would seem prudent to obtain an independent assess-
ment. of the software, including off-nominal situations that could
affect all computers.
The auxiliary power units have had a history of troubles that
make their reliability questionable. These car, of course, be de-
velopmental problems, but an overall review ot these units # including
hot, restart and full assessment of environmental impact on reliability
may well be in order.
The thermal protection system concept seems to be soundly
based, but manufacturing and application problems need continued
review and test confirmation if we are to get a better appreciation
of the effects of steps, gaps, and potential handling damage on the
tolerance to 'heat input. These factors greatly influence tile yield
and the ease or difficulty of application. Tt is also important to
review the planned trajectory of the first flight in order to minimize
the combined heating rate and load on the thermal protection system.
The development of the main engine--a difficult task--has been
slowed down by unexpected problems. The Panel does not believe that
these are insoluble, but adequate time must be allowed in the schedule
for real solutions--not questionable fixes=-to be developed. Testing
must tb,en be done on individual engines before the main propulsion
tests are begun. This could affect the schedule for orbital flight
tests.
The severe technical problems that have been encountered in the
development of the Shuttle hardware have properly occupied most of the
time of the program reviewers and managers. It is now appropriate to
evaluate the training activities of the many people involved in the
preparation, launch, and maintenance of the Shuttle. Reliability of
these activities requires adequate, checklists, procedures, and train-
ing programs if they are to fully support Shuttle operations.
The Panel is of the opinion that the shuttle program is in
excellent shape when viewed in the context of the overall task, schedule
and budget.
The Space Shuttle task assumed by NASA was to proceed from an
experience of individual scientific experiments to the design, con-
struction and demonstration of a routine transportation system. The
conventional approach to this problem would be in a series of steps:
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first, to establish performances second, to establish lifol and third,
to establish routine operation. NASA chose to approach this multi
year, multi-billion-dollar project in one continuous success-oriented
program. The Panel's reviews lead it to believe that no insurmountable
technical problems are apparent at this time and that in the context of
the whole the schedule delays and budget overruns have not been signifi-
cant. We area now entering the crucial period of toL•al system confirma-
tion,and evaluators and development teams must be alert to potential
unforeseen problems and vigorous in their complete solution. lgow,
more than at any time in the program, the momentum, the schedules and
the visibility of any program problem will provide an environment
within which less than complete solutions will be tempting. This must
be avoided at all casts.
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INTRODUCTION
The Aerospace Safety Advisory panel was established by statute
some ten years ago to provide an independent, knowledgeable identifi-
cation anu assessment of undue risks attendant to NASA's operations.
Priority was to be given to manned flight, and the Panel, while it is
to comment on the adequacy of proposed safety standards, does not have
u responsibility to solve problems, set standards or alleviate risks.
Briefly stated, the Panel's role is to make use of its observa-
tions and experience to
1. adv :sae where we see risks;
2. in areas of high risk, investigate adequacy
of solutions;
3. in areas of excessive risk, recommend alter-
nate solutions;
4. review the adequacy of the Management, System
to perceive and cope with risks; and
5	 identify areas that need support in the
solution of risk problems.
In any consideration of the role of the Panel it must be borne
in mind that the composition of the Panel will, in fact, have a great
effect on what is .asked of ;,t and what it can accomplish. The Panel
consists of a group of senior persons, each of whom is experienced in
the management of technically oriented or complex projects. The mem-
bers are appointed by the Administrator of NASA and the Panel is con-
gressionally chartered.
The value to the Administrator of the Panel's activities lies in
the objective overview of NASA and its contractors' management system
and their results, by a group without opetatioral responsibility but
with program continuity.
The Panel has developed the procedure of reviewing programs,
selected hardware, and management procedures of NASA and its contrac-
tors for evidence that the proper management emphasis is placed on
safety and the achievement of mission goals without undue risk. The
Panel holds two-day formal meetings approximately bi-monthly; its
members attend formal reviews and also talk informally with NASA and
contractor managers and operating personnel. This mode of operation
affords individual Panel members the opportunity to review specific
program plans and selected hardware in the field of their special
interests or expertise. From these investigations the Panel identifies
what, in its opinion, are reducible risks and assesses the impact on
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NASA's operations of making changes or accepting the ;.inks, The Panel's
work is presented to NASA management in the course of informal as well
as formal discussions, and Js recorded in an annual report for both
Congress and NASA management summarizing the Panel's conclusions and
data bane.
We would propose to continue the fact-finding in areas that
need attention, and then to draw conclusions from the facts and our ex-
perience that will be useful, to NASA in the ►nanagemennt of its work.
We believe there are two past examples that are partnentc we were
instrumental in getting NASA to name a chief engineers a4d also in es-
tablishing a technical assessment group. The Panel also fulfills its
responsibility by expressing its opinion as to the risk involved in
specific NASA, operutions that it has investigated. This has proven to
be helpful in the past and we will continua with such assessments sub-
jects, as before, to the limitations of our time and expertise.
With the advent of the Shuttle program with it.A goal. of a reus-
able transportation system, the Panel fo=d it necessary and desirable
to divide up the fact-finding workload by assigning cearcain Panel mem-
liars to various Lispects of the Shuttle, taking into ar-.ount the experi-
ence and interests of the membo s. They than report to the Panel in
full session and a consensus is deevelopad. We propose to continue this
procedure. Now that ALT is almost complete, we plan to reorganize our
assignments to focus on OFT and begin in aeronautics as follows:
FAC114-FINDING ASSIGNKENTS
Member	 Shuttled Fact-Finding Responsibility
C. A, Syvertson
	
Mission Operations and TPS
W. M. Hawkins	 Orbiter
S. C. Himmel	 Propulsion
H. F. Grier	 Avionics
F. C. Di Luzio
	
Hazard Assessment
G. D. Harrington	 Control of Human Error
H. K. Nason	 Payload Hazard Assessment
W. D. Johnson*	 Launch Preparation and Logistics
J. L. Kuranz	 Aeronautics
*Resigned; replaced by Lt. Gen. Leighton I.t Davis, USAF, Ret.
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Today we will comment on the upcoming taficone-off flights as
we have on the previous ALT flights. An explanatory comment is ap-
propriate. The Panel has traditionally been asked its opinion about
the state of readinens of operations as a whole, but we now selase
that as a result of our interest in vome of the details we may appear
to be certifying operational events. This is not our role and can mis-
lead one as to the extent of our certification, no matter how quali-
fied it may be. Omr Panel cannot be expected to investigate in detail
all the aspects of an operation. which are required for a complete
certification. This certification is the task of the programmatic
organization which we can supplement by knowledgeable, independent
assessment, but we cannot supplant the responsibility of the program.
organization.
It is worth repenting that the ASAP is a group of senior, experi-
enced people who should dig into details only enough to interpret from
their experience the shortcomings, if any, of the Management system
and to make recommendations for its betterment. We should not attempt
to do technical design no matter how appealing the job is to us--
that's not our job. Neither should we certify an operation unless we
have examined it in depth.
We need a definition of the Management System we are talking
About. We would say that it is the NASA organization that identifies
tasks, formulates specifications, assigns responsibilities and monitors
performance so as to achieve effective and economical solutions to the
problems at hand. ASAP has a legitimate concern with this because in
the "chips are down" operation which NASA is responsible for, safety
in its broadest sense is a result of the proper solution of all the
problems. It is also important to spend no more than necessary on a
given phase of the problem, to assure that funds are available for other
,areas that need to be worked on. We will talk about the test program
in this context.
In all the Panel's work there is a common thread and that is
risk--its identification and assessment. A problem that greatly con-
cerns us, as well as many other people, is what is the aggregate risk?
What is the composite result of all the individual risks that one
identifies, quantifies and accepts? In any complex undertaking where
design is divided into subsystems and done by different groups, it is
difficult to coordinate the effect of all the engineering tradeoffs
on the total system. In the cane of the Shuttle, this process is
further complicated by the fact that not only technology, but money
and schedule pressures also drive the tradeoffs. In fact, the same
problems exist in individual subsystems where design efforts and ex-
ternal influences have been traded off over a long ,period of time.
Thy
 Shuttle~ is such a complex system that judgment alone may be inade-
quate as an assessment tool.
It is suggested that there should be a formal effort within the
program to quantify the aggregate risk to the project of the total system
concept and the charges that have occurred in the design and test pro-
gram.
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There are many methods of identifying a risk, bat it can only
be quantified as the result of a test progrAm And hence the importance
of the test program that NASA so stresses *
 rik, a program as largo as
Shuttle the amount of testing can be so graott that it must be reviewed
to make sure of Its pertinency and necessity in order that all risks
inherent in the mission onviroment are accounted for within a test
program that can be accomplishod within the time and funds available.
In 
an 
evaluation of the adequacy of the test program for risk
assessment the tendency is to propose an outside entity to take a
"fresh" look. This in difficult for two reascftij, Firxte the people
making such an axacomment must have been involved virtually from 9day,
=0 11 so that they know the entire history and modus operandi and,
second, this should not be an ad hoc effort, but a continuing part of
the Management System. We believe the capability and funds to do this
are within NASA, but It should be a discrete responsibility. It can-
not be done by the engineering organization as a part-time effort.
The ToohnicAl AoVessment Group at JSC would seem to be a good model for
the aggregate risk assessment task and perhaps could be involved in the
task via a re.itructuring and thee
	
of some personnel. In order
to place the aggregate risk assessment in the proper perspective and
yet involve it adequately, it should probably be i, programmatic staff
function, but in any ewi , -t should not have an engineering design function
of any type.
This year it seems appropriato to involve the Panel in NASAOa
aeronantic as opposed to manned space activities. The charter *stub-
lishing the Panel directs priority to manned space flight, but makes
provision for review of the other NASA programs, The organization and
character of the manned space flight activities are different from the
other programs, and the first stop the Panel should take is an identi-
fication of its appropriate relationship to these, now to it, Activi-
ties, To this end we have assigned a prime responsibility to one of
our members to the role of the Panel in this area. In doing this we
intend to solicit program input and to submit our plans for concurrence
before proceeding.
The continued and broad overview of the Management System does
not rule out the Panel's applying its expertise on an ad hoc basis to a
specific problem for the Administrator. A good example is the Panel's
consideration of the threaded fastener problem where a public charge
was made that NASA was procuring inadequate fasteners for its programs.
The Panel's investigation and opinion helped NASA refute that charge.
In summary, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is a senior,
experienced. group with continuity, whose task is to review the pro-
grams of NASA and identify for the Administrator undue risks that may
nave escaped the notice of the program managers as a result of their
close Involvement with daily problems. It is also to assess the po-
tential or aggregate risk as a result of the acceptance of many indi-
,/idual risks, each one of which was validly accepted.
MISSION OPEPATXONS
The outstanding success of the ALT programs is of itself a
better report on tho mission operations than the Safety Panel could
present, he the program has progressed there have been some
schedule problems, some equipment problems and soma procedural prob-
lems. in toto, however, the** have been minimal alongside Vie fact
that the technical objeQtives of the flight series have been met and
tl^* specific answers have, in almost all canoe # been positive from the
prt)qram point of view. For us to dwell on those points would be ropet-
if.ivo and unnecessary. There are two pointep however, that the Panel
fools bear emphasis.
Fl,xstj the Panel is impressed by the indications from ALT that
the modeling and analytical procedures used in the Orbiter design have
been relatively closely validated. Thies 	 a oubstantial degree of
confidence in the theoretical and model work involved in the upcoming
OFT 4utivitias, while the problems in the orbital and entry phases are
different than in the subsonic regime. it is a milestones to document
a good general concurrence between theory and practice lit the early
phases of the flight test programs leading to orbital flight.
The second ponint that we should like to astrass ij the dedication
and competence of the entire flight test organization untler peke
Slayton. These people represent a somewhat different cuLture than the
more theoretical and scientific design people in the program, and the
burden of bridging the gap is on them. They must understand and make
work the product of the program. They did this magnificently, and
successfully demonstrated what, up to the present, has turned out to
be a sup6rlor product.
ORBITER READINESS FOR ORBITAL PLIGHT TESTS
Introduction
Before ditctissing the current status of the Orbiter and its
system, it should be emphasized that the operation of the ASAP and
its individual members would not be possible without the open doors
of the NASA Centers and the contractors to the requests# questious
and visits of the Panel. I # for one, want to express my gratitude
for this universal attitude.
NASA # since the start of the Shuttles 	 has been con-
strained tiy budgetary pressures and originally estimated schedules
that define 4 substantially different program environment than NASA
Las been exposed to before. This has constrained changes when the
original concepts were found to be less than optimum, and it has
caused the program to be planned as a completely successful venture.
The inevitable difficulties have caused test programs and decisions
to bc postponed with the result that many tasks are left to be done
close to first orbital flight.
A second factor that has impacted the program is that the
NASA Centers and the chose n contractors have accumulated their
experience in space or military aircraft programs and thane is little
awareness of the growth and sophistication of the technologies im-
plied by aircraft designed to "fail-operationally." Theo* tech-
nologlon are most apparent in agencies, government and conaimrcial,
involved In transport aircraft for the military and the airlines.
in spite of these problems, the program has made remarkable
advances as demonstrated by the latest tailcone-off ALT experiment.
Orbiter. Status, General
The ALT flightsonow including the first tailcone-off experi-
ment, have demonstrated the aerodynamic, the control system, the
computer, and the operational concept of horizontal landing in an
impressive way. Based on this success, the ASAP juggests that the
remaining tailcone-off flights should include an experiment ? even
if very short, In which the blind landing system flies the aircraft
on approach.
Still to go, however, is a thorough evaluation of the boost-
ers, the external tank, the launch system, and the abort planning.
The ASAP will spend the remainder of this year and next in expanding
its attention to these system elements and operations plans.
ILight, Control Systems
Very early in the deliberations of the ASAP we questioned the
concept og the flight control system and its vulnerability to single
point failures. The state of the art in transport aircraft, both
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military and commercial, has progressed substantially since the
Shuttle control system was conceived, and it would be profitable
for the future operations of the Shuttle to incorporate as many
of the new concepts of how to design fail-safe and fail-operational
systems ;into the Shuttle.
An example of one such Shuttle control system is the rudder
speed brake actuation subsystem. There are several critical pointS1
for instance, the gear boxes which if they fail, completely will jam
the entire system, in spite of the fact that the system is fed by
three completely independent hydraulic power sources. Since there
are two of these gear boxes in series and since the gear loadings
are higher than is standard practice on helicopters, it is essential
that test programs for certification be strenuous and thorough.
Similar single point failure potentially exists in the two drive
shafts and eight actuators, any one of which, if completely jammed,
eliminates that side of the rudder speed brake s ►stem. Here, too,
test programs are essential to confirm that these elements are
sufficiently reliable and that they do not constitute a hazard to
the Shuttle flight's success.
A somewhat different single point failure problem appeared
in the elevon servoactuator system. Three hydraulic power sources
are again available, but the system comes together in a single
switchifig valve system, power spool and single ram actuator. NASA
responded to initial criticisms of this system and has redesigned
the actuator eliminating many single point failure elements. There
are now only 11 such elements per actuator, a ,.id these have been de-
sighed in such a way that a leak is prevented even though a seal
fails by means of a backup close fitting metallic seal with a con-
trolled leak rate sufficiently low that the hydraulic capacity is
not exceeded for any one mission. There are four such actuators on
the orbiter and they, too, must be subjected to an extremely critical
testing program to confirm their adequacy. In a review of all the
systems on the Orbiter there are a number that are shown to have
similar characteristics. The body flap is similar to the speed brake
and the main engine vector control pistons are similar to the Fortress
piston. There is a rather different potential problem concerning the
main engine fuel control which relies on hydraulic: power for opora-
tion. In this case the .hydraulic control is a single string and
depends upon an APU for power. There is no backup hydraulic power.
Thus, if the hydraulic power fails, that fuel control is locked in
whatever position it was operating at. It is not known how long the
control, will stay in the locked position. Ii it drifts or is in a
position which would cause the engine to reach any safety temperature
or pressure limit, the engine will shut down, causing the Orbiter to
enter some kind of abort mode. It is suggested that testing of the
main engine should include a simulated failure of this kind. If the
likelihood of the engine continuing to run is high, this may not be
critical.. However, the Panel could find no confirmation of this likeli-
hood and thereby suggests that accumulators or backup hydraulic systems
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be considered to prevent this failure. The APU is the source of all
hydraulic power and has been a continuing problem during development.
Although there are three "us driving the three separate hydraulic
systems, the likelihood of one or more A'PU failure in the early
Orbiter's flights would seem to be perceptible. It is suggested
that the program review instal.ation of backup accumulators or a
fourth system for early `lights. In any case, those early flights
should be loaded such that the center of gravity is in a position
where reentry and landing might be possible with only one hydraulic
system operating. Similarly, flight modes .should be selected that
provide the highest chance of return with jammed dive brakes or body
.flaps.
Testing Program
As a result of early pressures on the budget and on the concepts
of the various system elements, many of which have changed, the testing
programs have become compressed and some are scheduled quite close to
the first orbital. flight.
From the schedule for delivery and test of the Fortress pistons
for the elevon a,:tuators it is noted that the qual testing of two units
is completed just 45 days prior to the scheduled first orbital flight.
The Panel urges that subsequent rescheduling not reduce any of this
qual testing and that the orbital flight be delayed, if necessary,
until the units are qualified. A .series of tests is then planned, en-
titled Fortress-Plus Testing. This is not completed until the Spring
of 1980, substantially beyond the first orbital flight. Since this is
the kind of testing designed to confirm how many reuses can be made of
the system rather than to confirm that the system is adequate for its
function, it is normal that the test span would come after the first
orbital flight. The Panel is not concerned by this overlap.
A.siniUar problem that has not yet been fully defined exists
with the O;.biter's reaction control subsystem. Due to the fact that
the configuration of this system was changed late in the design pro-
cess, the implications for testing the elements have not been fully
evaluated.
We note that there are a number of configurations of reaction
control, rockets,. Although there are only two types of combustion
chamber and throat, the skirt configurations are numerous and differ-
ent. Since these rocket nozzles are exposed to external heat loads,
the reentry end must be designed so that the radiant heat output within
the installation fairing is controlled. The implication is strong that
the test program will be complex. This will be one of the Panel's
evaluation subjects through the end of 1977 and all of 1978.
Summary Assessment
It would appear that the .multiple system concepts of the Shuttle
do not represent the known state of the art in design for "failing-
operationally." The NASA laboratories have responded by making
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substantial changes and augmenting the test program to validate those
elements of the system which could be construed as single point failures.
It is suggested by the Panel that ,many of these systems should be re-
viewed in the event that added shuttles are purchased. The Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel will review in detail the redundancy concepts
in the cabin and environmental system, the reaction control system (as
previously noted), the APU (its water boiler, lobe system, control
valves and operation in the main engine environment), and also the
boosw and main engine vector controls. The Panel will reconsider the
abort concepts to determine if additional changes to the Shuttle could
be made in order to avoid some of the most hazardous.
The Use of Safety Panel and Other Outside Reviewers
It would appear from the ASAP experience that many of our cur-
rent concerns might have been avoided had the Panel been involved in
the early ccncept of the system. This suggests that similar evaluation
groups should be brought in whenever possible while the system concepts
are baling formed. It is worth noting that the McDonnell-Douglas review
of the current flight control system 1s to be completed only nine
months before the first orbital flight. tt is obvious that any output
from such a -eview will be too late to affect the configuration of the
Shuttle before first launch unless the change implied is quite simple.
In view of the complexity of this system, the McDonnell-Douglas review
should continue, but if major problems are uncovered the first flight
schedple is bound to be delayed.
It is the Panel's opinion that NASA has re mponded completely to
all of the Panel's suggestions and has outlined test programs which,
when completed, should confirm that the present Orbiter will fulfill
its mission safely.
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SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE
This past year has seen both significant progress and some
serious technical problems in the Main Engine program. Problems
were, perhaps, to have been expected as the engine reprejents a
venture into new areas of technology. As a result of the prob-
lems the program is behind schedule, and work-around plans to
sapport key milestones have had to be devised.
Problems
As has been the case for the past year, the turbomachinery is
the principal focus of the technical troubles of the engine develop-
ment program. A series of major problems, two involving hardware
failure and fire, have kept the ,program behind schedule.
At the beginning of the year the High Pressure Fuel Turbo-
pump (HPOTP) exhibited subsynchronous whirl and turbine bearing
problems that precluded operating at RPL. After intensive efforts,
stiffening of the HPOTP shaft and modification to the turbine bearing
coolant flow brought the problems under control. These changes per-
mitted the achievement of engine operation at RPL early this spring.
Shortly thereafter a High Pressure Oxygen Turbopump failed
during an engine test at NSTL. The failure was accompanied by a
fire and, in addition to destruction of the pump, major damage was
done to the engine. The test stand suffered only minor damage. It
took quite a while to determine the cause of the failure. The origin
was found to be in the seal assembly that serves to isolate the tur-
bine from the pump. To permit the resumption of engine testing, an
int( • im fix was devised. The lift-off face seal that had served as
the primary LOX seal was replaced with a three-step labyrinth seal
and the helium purge flow rate in the intermediate seal was increased
substantially. Ultimately the entire seal assembly must be revised.
The character of the revision is well defined and development testing
at the seal level is in process.
With the interim seal modification, many successful, long-
duration runs were achieved from late July through August. About
4,000 seconds of running were accumulated in this relatively short
interval. The average thrust levels for these runs increased as
the test program proceeded. During this period a 301-second dura-
tion run at RPL was achieved. Then, on September 8, another failure
occurred. This also involved a LOX fire and resulted- in the loss of
most of a HPOTL, a LPOTP and the interconnecting duct. Again, test
stand damage was minor.
The investigation is still going on. It appears that the
failure originated within the HPOTP. To date the HPOTP seals have
been exonerated. There are indications that there was a bearing
overload. Whether this is cause or effect is yet to be determined.
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Of concern is that the failure may have resulted from a subtle
marginality in detail mechanical design. Two other pumps of the same
configuration have been run for considerable time without failure,
albeit one of them showed some evidence of bearing distress. Another
possibility is that some phenomenon associated with long running at
high power levels may be manifesting itself. In the highly mechani-
cally-interactive system of a high speed, high pressure turbopump it
would not be surprising for load distribution to change significantly
as power level changes. Such a shift could, for instance, easily
change an acceptable hearing load to an unacceptable one. Possibilities
such as this one are being examined by the inveetigating teams that have
been established. Testing has recently been resumd with added instru-
mentation. Hopefully, the data will help in finding the culprit.
This most recent problem has impacted the Main Propulsion Test
(MPT) program that h„., been scheduled for December. It would obviously
be imprudent to risk (AN age to a set of three engines in the MPTA prior
to establishing and implementing corrective action for this last failure.
Progress
All is not bleak in the program, however. On the positive side
of the ledger, the engine has been operated at rated power level (RPL)
a number of times including the 301-second duration run noted earlier..
The 75:1 area ratio nozzle has been run successfully. The combustion
systems have proven to be stable and, with trimming type modifications
to injector flow patters, should provide the desired life characteris-
tics. Much of the auxiliary equipment has completed design verifica-
tion testing satisfactorily and the remaining tests are on schedule.
The controller has performed very well in the field. It has proven to
be a great asset to the program by permitting changes in sequencing
and valve rates to be made via software rather than hardware. This
provides for rapid development of start sequences and desired system
dynamics--previously a slow process.
The thermodynamic performance of the turbomachinery has been
established experimentally, The design modifications required to cor-
rect performance deficiencies have been defined and sufficient experi-
mental verification has been obtained to warrant confidence that
desired thrust and efficiency can be achieved. Fabrication of modified
hardware is in process. It is estimated that these "fixes” will all be
incorporated into the development hardware by early next year.
AgAPgamPn+-_
By way of summary and assessment, much progress has been achieved
in the program. Identifying the fixes for the mechanical problems of
the HPOTP and proving them out is the major immediate challenge. Once
that is accomplished, accumulating engine running time over the power
spectrum to demonstrate sufficient durability for commitment to MPT
is a key requirement.
A
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For the longer term, consistency in performanct both run-to-
run and engine-to-engine must be demonstrated tq provide confidence
in the design. Preferably such demonstrations should be accomp-
lished if at all practicable with engines that incorporate all the
perforr;ance fixes referred to earlier. Such demonstrations will, of
course, be a part of the test program required to establish confi-
dence in the durability of the engine for operational use.
As noted earlier, tie MPT schedule has been impacted. Without
intending to be pessimistic, it must be noted that the possibility of
an impact on the OFT schedule is present. The demonstrated ability to
accumulate much running time in a short period offers the possibility
that an impact can be avoided if the fixes are successful and no new
,problems surface. In any event, it would seem prudent to consider
contingency plans for meeting the established testing goals for angine
flight certification for OFT. It would also be appropriate to examine
whether any alternate approaches to achieving flight certifiation
might be advisable. Of course, any such changes in ,plans should be
the subject of thorough management review. It is this aspect of the
program and the testing itself that will be the focus of Panel atten-
tion on the Main Engine for the coming year.
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AVIONICS
It is difficult to make a specific critique of the Shuttle
Avionics system because the problem really is the determination of
the level of confidence in its proper operation as a result of
testing of the complex system that has so far in the ALT program
demonstrated its success.
The system is divided into two parts and their testing: hard-
ware, software, and the necessary integration or systems testing.
Hardware has not been an undue problem, and the problems that
have surfaced have been resolved in a timely manner with very few
"ghosts" left to plague our confidence. The Panel and the program
both are con.erned about the number of recant computer problems, but
a new computer will be used for the orbital flight, and the redundant
management of the present computers is satisfactory for the current
operations. The Panel believes that the Management System can and will
effectively cope with any unexpected "black box" problems.
People tend to feel suspicious of software because, unl,i,ke hard-
ware, you can't "kick the tires." Early on, the Shuttle software was
plagued with escalating and changing requirements, but as that problem
was controlled and laboratory system testing was emphasized, the soft-
ware has straightened out and seems to be in good shape. Continued
testing in the laboratories will enhance the degree of confidence that
we now feel in the vital software area. We believe that successful
ALT blights to date reflect a maturity of the Avionics system that is
remarkable, considesoing the few times that the Orbiter has "played"
together.
The Panel's concern about the Avionics system for OFT centers
around the new computer and the expanded mission as compared to ALT.
Every effort must be made to structure and program it so that the
test time and results already accumulated can be directly applied to
the new computer. In the OFT configuration the enlarged memory and
the new computer should in large part supply margins of safety, not
open the door to unrestrained changes and additions to the computer's
tasks.
The Avionics system of the Orbiter is akin to the nervous
system of a human being. Both are extremely complicated and have many
of the same functions, sensory and physical inputs, signal condition-
ing and transmission, prioritizing, computation, command, feedback,
updating and monitoring of performance. In such a complicated system
the number of permutations and combinations is so large that the major
system problem is to be aware of the results of any possible combina-
tion of inputs. Man Formally spends about a quarter of his life try-
ing to learn the limitations of his system in response to the
environment and the characteristics of his personal components. In
	
a
the Shuttle we do not have this long to learn our system, and thus
this illustrates the major problem facing Orbiter Avionics. It is
19
the understanding and correlation of the ,integrated elements in the
time available so that we can predict the response of the system to
any possible real set of inputs.
For some parts of the system this can be done by analysis,
for some by component test and in the cash of that indispensable
component software, by running on the computers against all conceiv-
able conditions. This assurance of component quality is very impor.,
tant and musk be done, but just as a man must learn to use his own
real set of components working together, so must the Shuttle be run
in final and real configurations sufficiently to demonstrate that its
responses to real life are those designed for and expected of it.
In the Panel's view, if there is an Avionics problem for OFT
it is simply the time necessary for alai-up configuration tests of
sufficient depth to give management the confidence it needs for the
first OFT. SAIL and ADL are needed for systems development tests,
but to the extent that they are not physically identical, to the
Orbiter, time must be available for sufficient Orbiter 102 testing,
dither at Palmdale-DFRC or at Kennedy.
The Panel's activities in Avionics for OFT will be centered
around the new computer and the tasting of the new software that must
cops: with an entire mission, including ascent and abort modes, not
just the last subsonic portion as in the case of ALT. The perform-
ances and successes of all the people involved in the Avionic,_-
system to date would lead us to believe that there are not insurmount-
able obstacles for OFT, but that the degree of confidence in the
system will be a function of discipline of requirements and the
specification and performance of an adequate test program.
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THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM
The Shuttle Thermal Protection System (TPS) remains a major
concern in the preparations for Orbital Flight Tests (OFT). One
source of concern is the problem of obtaining adequate production
rates for the RSI tiles. With this problem there is a potential
desire to relax dimensional tolerances for the tiles. In addition,
delays in obtainin g certain specific sets of tiles are making it
necessary to install the tiles out of sequence. Larger, tolerances
and out-of-soquence installation could both result in larger steps
and gaps between tiles. At the same time, concern over temperatures
in the Orbiter basic structure has led to a reshaping of the entry
trajectory to reduce the total heat load experienced during entry.
The changes in trajectory result in lower heat load being traded
for higher heating rates. As a rule of thumb, a 25-degree reduction
in structural temperatures results in a 100-degree increase in peak
surface temperatures. Peak surface temperatures have thus increased
from 2500 degrees to 2600 degrees Fahrenheit. A combination of
higher peak heating rates and larger gaps and steps results in sig-
nificantly increased gap and step heating and raises the question of
whether or not the currant material can withstand this higher heating.
There are several problema associated with obtaining the re-
quired test data on the TPS. First, ground test conditions are not
Likely to result in the proper transition Reynolds number. It is
probably true that the transition Reynolds number won't be known
accurately until after the first entry flight. Knowledge of the
transition Reynolds number is doubly important; not only are heating
rates much higher for a turbulent boundary layer, but also steps
between tiles will have a larger effect on heating in a turbulent
boundary layer than a laminar one. Second, our arc jet facility
capabilities are such that it is very difficult to provide the higher
required test temperatures, especially with the proper boundary
layers. Normally under ground test conditions boundary layers are,
relatively speaking, thinner than they would be in flight and this
tends to magnify the effects of gaps and steps. Finally, the overall
capacity of arc jet facilities at Ames, Johnson and Langely is such
that 100 percent success will be required to meet the present schedule
of tests. There is little excess capacity for added tests in certain
facilities if such would be required; and to make the situation even
more difficult, arc jets are not the most reliable of ground test
facilities, and facility failures are not uncommon. Any major failure
could complicate scheduling problems.
Future ASAP activities related to the TPS should include the
careful tracking of any trajectory changes as they affect the trades
between structure temperatures and surface temperatures. In addition,
we should keep close watch on the TPS testing program because it is
very critical to the qualification of materials. Consideration is
being given to gap fillers in order to reduce the effects of the gaps
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on both heating and boundary layer transition; but much remains to
be done in the development of an acceptable gap filler pad.
Finally # continued attention will be required in the RSI the
vanufActure area because of the numerous difficulties that have
been experienced in this area,
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HAZARD ASSESSMENT
For the past several months the Panel has been reviewing and
participating in each stop of the management of Safety, Reliability
and Quality Assurance functions. Particular attention has been
paid to the specific responsibility of the Johnson Space Center as
the lead Center, and its role in risk assessments.
The ALT successful flights to date verify the general ade-
quacies of the Orbiter design in subsonic flight.
During the past year improvements have been made in the manner
safety consideration and evaluations were handled. Thera was a
greater and highly visible interest by NASA Headquarters in suggest-
ing improvements to the Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance
System, and in examining and questioning the findings. Efficient
use of special task forces was made with good results. The Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel also concentrated on working much closer with
Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance organizations at the several
centers involved. The increased attention resulted in a more aggres-
sive approach to risk assessments.
The imposition of several changes to the methods applied to the
identification and evaluation of risks, particularly "Mingle point"
has strengthened the process. The four: important change are:
1. adding an engineering representative to the
Major Safety Concerns Screening Board, whose
functions are:
a. ensure periodic review of all identified
safety concerns;
b. review major candidate safety concerns
in-depths
c. select major safety concerns for program
management visibilitys and
d. document major safety concern status
and cl,osuxe rationale.
2. adding representatives of program/project
management as observers to the Major Safety
Screening Soardj
3. the requirement placed on Johnson Space Center
and already under implementation to conduct a
critical functions assessment is being made by
the systems engineering group at the Johnson
Space Center;
A. develop a method to evaluate the aggregate risk
involved.
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Several additional and somewhat independent reviews are being
proposed, i.e., an independent analysis of critical Shuttle Avionics
systems and a Shuttle system integrated functions assessment.
Some of the questions the review of the ,Avionics system should
answer arei
1. What are the functions controlled by software
which could cause loss of arbiter and/or crew
If a single command is, or is not, initiated
because of a single software fault?
2. What safety-critical commands, if inadvertently
initiated in error, cannot be overriden by the
crew?
3. What safety-critical commands inadvertently
initiated by the crew do not have software
controls to inhibit action?
4. What is the plan for software prioritization of
the safety-critical functions to assure that they
are not buried in low priority functions?
S.	 what are the safety-critical iunctionss during
planned single computer on-orbit operations?
6. What is the complete software verification pro-
gram in ADL# SDI, and SAIL, and how does it v rift'
the critical functions involving nominal/off-,
nominal contingency events? what are the limita-
tions of this program and resulting inadequacies?'
As NASA must use its resources judiciously, an in-depth review
of the need for and the extent of these new approaches should be made.
Perhaps the same end results can be obtained through other arrangements
such as usin„,{ existing personnel and organizations.
The need for an aggregate risk assessment has generated several
approaches to developing the needed information in the right format.
The process of making a critical functions assessment by mission
phase/events will provide much of the additional needed data..
If implemented, the independent analysis of critical Shuttle
Avionics systems will also provide useful data and increase the =nfi
deuce in the aggregate risk assessment. The Panel will work with and
monitor this effort at the Johnson Space Center.
The Panel believes that the present Safety, Reliability and
Quality Assurance System strengthened as indicated can perform a credit-
able function in OFT 1 risk assessment.
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HUMAN MROR
The Panel has studfed in some depth and over a long period of
time the various management paperwork systems used to control design
and execution of design. These systems appear to assure that design
features and design changes will be well thought out, and to assure
the closing of the loop in the case of required changes. However,
these paperwork systems are all dependent on the accuracy of perform-
ance of work or of observation on inspection so that the input informa-
tion to the paperwork or computer systems corresponds to the real world
of the hardware. This has been referred to as the man-material inter-
face as opposed to the various interfaces of paperwork systems. The
Panel is now in the process of investigating the basis of confidence in
this aspect of control, Visits to Downey a»d Palmdale have been made
to determine how this is handled by RI and its subcontractors. Also a
preliminary visit has been made to KSC.
The control system starts with documents which establish inspec-
tion points and procedures for major subcontractors as well as for RI.
These are so selected as to assure that the quality and conformance of
the work to this point can be verified.
The Manufacturing Verification system (MV) permits manufacturing
personnel to inspect work in process. These inspection points are
spelled out in the manufacturing operations record. MV stamps are
issued only to qualified manufacturing personnel and will be withdrawn
if the individual is careless in certifying to work which is not in con-
formance. The right to have an MV stamp is being developed to be a
matter of pride to the individual so as to reduce the likel{.hood of
work so stamped to :fail in subsequent QA inspection. A similar process
being established at KSC is called Designated Verification (DV).
The contractor qua.Uty assurance personnel are responsible for
final in-process verification. In general, this QA signoff will include
a determination that the previous MV stampa4 steps are correct. Only
items which are previously determined to be non-critical are permitted
to be passed by the MV procedure if they cannot be later picked uj. by
the QA inspection.
suitable Government agencies are used for final acceptance of
the work. These are the Defense Contract Administration Services for
RY and the majority of subcontractors, and Navy, Air Force or FAA in
specific instances. From manufacturing flow plans and problem reports
mandatory inspection points are set. NASA establishes controls, tests,
and inspection, metrology and reporting systems.
The system is highly dependent oh the use of personnel with a
previous track record of experience and/or detailed extensive training.
Common inspection requirements for manufacture, assembly, and pre- and
posit flight aid in the human factor. Use of streamers (red flags) on
non-flight hardware with numbered records of their addition and removal
decreases the likelihood of leaving such articles on during flight.
Detailed test and checkout procedures are used to assure correct posi-
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tioning of valves, switches and a go forth.
The basis of confidence in the system may be sumarized as
follows
1,	 audits show no significant deficiency in than
systemf
2. surveillance inspections correct any physical
discrepancies on the spots
3. systems are progressively improvads
4. Fewer problems are .found on each flight' and
S.
	
statiutics show that most Osacrepanclas are
found before final, inspection, a better average
than industry in general.
Thera remain concerns which must be continuously watched.
People will fail to follow instructions, mspecially if not clearly
tvr.tton, or written without concern for the human element, Changes
can confuse people over-familiarity with the system may cause some
people to bypass procedures,
The need for continual updating of inapection checklista,
modifications, and temporary installations give particular trouble
because of lack of experience with these. Procedures for handling
unexpected conditions # such as spills, must be reviewed and continu-
ally updated.
Implementation of the system defined haxein has reduced human
errors. Continued monitori.nq is required to assure that all disciplines
and controls are maintained. Corrective action must consider the con-
tribution of human errors to all discrepant situations.
i
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NSW PROJECTS
T'nus far today the speakers have concerned themselves with the
Panel's traditional role in the Space Shuttle program where vie have
been concerned with the safety of man in space--our Number One
Priority. Xt now seems appropriate to extend a portion of the inter-
:sst and activities of the Panel to NASA's aeronautic and non-manned
space activities. in order to introduce the Panel to this area we
have met earliez today with pr. James J. Kramer, NASA's Associate
Administrator for Aeronautics and Space Technology, for a briefing on
the general activities, and we intend to follow up with in-depth
discussions with the appropriate programmatic people. rn this en-
deavor we are fortunate to have on the Panel Drs. Himmel and, Syvertson
who are both involved in these NASA activities.
Tt; is the Panel's intent to develop a schedule of its activities
in NASA's areas other than manned space flight and to submit such a
schedule for HeaOquarters' concurrence before we proceed. Suffice it
to say that the Pa..3l is very interested in these, new to it, activities,
and will expect to make an effective contribution to these programs.
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4RETROSPECT
I joined the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Paned four years
ago. During most of the time I have served with the Panel I was also
on active duty as an Air Force Lieutenant General., serving as the
Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency here in Washington. I have
submitted my resignation from the Panel because of the demands of
the position I accepted in industry when I retired from the military.
X was most reluctant to leave the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel,
having found a great amount of satisfaction in the close association
with the NASA staff, the industries which work with NASA, and with
the very dedicated members of the Panel.
It also has been very exciting and rewarding dealing with some
of the problems which have come to the attention of the Panel during
this period. I believe the Panel has contributed valuably and hope
that I had some small part in that contribution.
I must admit that initially I was somewhat reluctant to chall-
enge or criticize anything NASA was doing. Frankly, NASA's successes
had been so stupendous that I was almost overawed. I found, however,
that even NASA was occasionally guilty of complacency, possibly be-
cause of those past successes. Occasionally I noted someone who was
afflicted by the old syndrome of: "But we've always done it that way."
So, soon I fou^d myself playing the role of a hero worshiper who has
realized that even his hero can occasionally be human. Perhaps even
more important I found that the hero (NASA) was receptive to challenges.
I found that NASA management at every level was highly aware of the
need for criticism. I also found they were patient when we asked
what often appeared to be silly questions. If indeed NASA was human,
NASA was also eager to listen and quick to react. It certainly seems
to me that NASA has responded promptly and thoroughly to the some-
"imes cynical input from the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.
I mentioned and must re-emphasize my reluctance to relinquish
my association with the Panel.. I really hate to give it up.. It gets
me right under this NASA badge. However, I must admit that my leav-
ing is probably heal;.hy for tae Panel. I believe it is good to have
some turnover in the membership of the Panel. A new critic is better
than an old critic. Some new thoughts are good for the Panel, just as
they are for NASA. Thus, I am sure that whoever replaces me on the
Panel will enhance its value to NASA and to the Congress.
Perhaps I may offer a few suggestions. First, I believe that
it may have been valuable to have had on the Panel an individual who
had an active role with the Department of Defense. It seems to me
that the close interface between NASA and DOD is most important in
the development and deployment of the National Space Transportation
System. I realize that both NASA and the DOD have exerted major
efforts to assure such an interface. Yet I believe that effort can
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bear even further emphasis because of the fact that this system
literally represents the total commitment of the United States
for manned spare activity and indeed for most of its space
activity for the foreseeable future.
I believe it is essential that there be separate roles for
NASA and DOD, However, I have seen some evidence of the jealous
guarding of traditional roles and prerogatives. Because of the
tremendous scope of the Space Shuttle program, because it is so
important to the United States and indeed to the world, because it
is unique and cannot be bound by tradition, I believe it is essen-
tial that both DOD and NASA challenge those roles. They should
deliberately examine whether some traditional roles should be
changed.
For example, I am aware that they have examined the command
and control aspects of the Space Transportation System and that
there is a consciousness of the need to avoid costly duplication.
I am convinced NASA can perform this role for the DOD without any
sacrifice of effectiveness and with due regard to the need for
careful adherence to international treaties. I am aware that some
of my DOD contemporaries may feel such remarks are heretical, but
I believe most would agree. As I indicated, I am aware that this
specific role has been discussed, but I urge continued attention.
As noted by Willis Hawkins, the operational mission of the
Space Shuttle is really a new role for NASA, since all previous
space ventures have been one-time flights. I would hope that NASA
will draw heavily upon DOD operational safety, and maintenance ex-
perience, since the Space Shuttle clearly must serve as an opera-
tional aircraft as it returns to its soft landing and its turn-
around operation. Going back to the remarks by Willis Haw}.;ins,
perhaps also more emphasis should be placed on -}he experience of
the transport industry. Again, I know NASA and the Air Force are
working closely together, probably even more closely since one of
NASA's Center Directors is now the Under Secretary of the Air Force
and an ex-Air Force Director of Laboratories is the Deputy Adminis-
trator of NASA. However, I wonder whether anyone has really set out
to challenge those traditional roles. I suggest that the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel might help to do so. In fact, I'll go even
a bit further to recommend that the Panel's charter might be expanded
to require it to look over DOD's shoulder as well as NASA's.
Finally, I would like to comment briefly about a role I be-
lieve the Panel has fulfilled. Often during the past four years I
have noted that the Panel, working quietly with the NASA and
industry management teams, has brought about change without fanfare
and often without really surfacing the issue. In many cases the
detailed conversations and working sessions in which the Panel par-
ticipated have resulted in decisions which might otherwise have
been missed, or at least delayed. In many cases there was no written
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report, no seeking of credit by either the Panel or the others in-
volved. It has simply been good teamwork and the personal satis-
faction from such actions has been rewarding indeed. I realize
that some of the Panel's activities require documentation and I
lxUieve the record shows abundant accomplishment. I suspect that
those quiet accomplishments that were never written down are at
least equally abundant.
Lest I appear bragadoccio, let me hasten to add that my
personal contribution has been very small indeed. The Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel as a whole, and very ably led by its Chairman,
Howard Nason, has provided some very dedicated and sustained efforts.
I believe its individual members have served its charter extremely
well and I appreciate having had the opportunity to serve with these
-fine people and this great organization.
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I am Herbert E. Grier, Chairman of the congressionally estab-
lished Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. At your request I should like to acquaint
you with our Panel, its method of operation, and our assessment of
NASA's Shuttle program.
The "housekeeping" for the Panel and its staff of three people
is done by NASA Headquarters, but the Panel itself is an independent
body that schedules its own investigations and submits its annual
reports to Congress and the NASA Administrator. The Panel feels an
obligation to be a timely force in the management system, and reviews
its findings with the appropriate people in NASA as the investigations
are completed. Our relations with the programmatic groups are excel-
lent and their responses to our comments are full and sincere. In
fact, we find that we must be careful not to unwittingly trigger an
undue response to a minor point.
The majority of the Panel members are from outside NASA and
all .c:-^ ,
 *;xperienced in the management of technical expertise. The
deili-: ,rations are such that each and every member is heard and inde-
pendently contributes to our reports, which are a consensus, not a
compromise.
The members of the Panel are listed below, and I have just
recently been chosen to be Chairman. Mr. Howard K. Nason has been
Our most recent past Chairman, and Dr. Charles D. Harrington was the
first Chairman when the Panel was established in 1968.
Members, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Lt. Gen. Leighton I. Davis (USAF, Ret.)
Mr. Frank C. Di Luzio
Mr. Herbert E. Grier
Dr. Charles D. Harrington
Mr. Willis M. Hawkins
Dr. Seymour C. Himme`,
Mr. John L. Kuranz
Mr. Howard K. Mason
Mr. Clarence A. Syvertson
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Each of the members spend two to four days per month on Panel acti-
vities and, as Chairman, I spend from one to two weeks per month
on behalf of the Panel.
The Panel's objective, and the limitation on the members'
time, indicate that we can be expected to review NASA operations
only to the extent necessary to judge the adequacy of the NASA
management system to identify risks and to cope with them in a safe,
efficient manner.
Before talking about the Shuttle specifically, I should like to
make a few observations on the philosophy of management and the changes
in that philosophy that we have perceived in NASA over the years.
NASA's early task was to implement a national commitment to
space exploration in a specified time frame. In order to do this
NASA had to develop not only the technology, but also the capability
to solve unknown problems in a timely manner. The results were spec-
tacular and the capability and expenditures massive. With changing
priorities, a greater knowledge of space, and the shifting of emphasis
from exploration to utilization, NASA experienced pressure to move
into a success-oriented program plan for the development of the Shuttle.
In such a program one assumes that the basics are known, accepts only
the identified contingencies, and plans staff, hardware and facilities
on this basis. if all works as planned this is by far the most economi-
cal way to accomplish a program. However, when unforeseen event's do
occur, the schedule must be relaxed and/or more funds made available
to solve the unforeseen problems. Phrased another way, planned maxi-
mum economy must have some flexibility in budget and schedule. The
Panel believes that this is an appropriate mode for Congress to ask
NASA to operate in. If all involved understand the process, no undue
or increased risks need to be incurred. The principal difficulty with
success-oriented planning is the controversy that arises as to whether
a contingency should have been or was planned for, and this causes a
tendency to overlook the fact that success-oriented planning in a
patient and understanding system will be the most economical.
The Panel's observations of the NASA management system have led
it to the conclusion that the system is objective and competent, and
while there were some initial learning problems in establishing success-
oriented programming for a project as large and complex as Shuttle,
safety does not seem to have been sacrificed as a result. We have,
however, arrived at the conclusion that any restrictions of the test
programs directly supporting the upcoming orbital flight tests must be
carefully examined and weighed.
In its investigations and deliberations the Panel has obviously
formed opinions on the state of the various parts of the projects. These
opinions follow, grouped by the Panel's specific categories of fact-
finding.
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11	 Mission 2L)erations
The Panel has been preoccupied with the mission planning
for the approach and landing test series. The ALT was pursued
in an orderly manner and efficiently executed. This bodes
wall for the mission planning for the orbital flight tests,,
although it is completely different in scope and magnitude.
The Panel is now reviewing the OFT planning and particularly
the provision for the various abort contingencies. It is too
early to evaluate this subject completely, but it seems to be
off on the right foot with a team that has demonstrated compe-
tence in the ALT program.
2. Thermal Protection System
The Thermal Protection System is a problem of a different
character. It is anew technology and must be evaluated by
plasma arc testing of small Samples. The desired thermal
characteristics are so difficult to achieve that questions of
bonding, fragility and reusability must of necessity take second-
ary roles during the development. Methods of inspection, refur-
bishment, replacement of bad tiles and perhaps even continued
exposure to humid air at the launch sites must be determined
from experience. We are continuing ^;o monitor this program, but
at present do not believe that the safety of the crew on the
initial flight is at stake and feel that some of the other con-
cerns must simply await full-scale testing. At this moment we
feel that the economics of a conventional aluminum air frame are
somewhat offset, but not overbalanced by what might be problems
of reusability of the TPS tile.
3. orbiter
We have deliberatley assigned the consideration of the
Orbiter as a vehicle to our Panel member with the most experi-
ence in transport aircraft. The orbiter in its intended use is
a transport and should take advantage of the lessons learned in
that industry. There are differences between the Shuttle and a
transport, for instance, in the matter of certain mechanical
system redundancies. We have brought this matter te the atten-
tion of the program and it has been thoroughly considered. We
acknowledge the difficulty of making the Shuttle adhere to all
the constraints of design of transport aircraft, particularly
since it is now an experimental vehicle. However, the Panel
'feels that the routinely operated and maintained operational
Shuttle would benefit from all critical subsystems being redun-
dant.
One of the Orbiter subsystems that has been troublesome in
the past is the Auxiliary Powez Unit (APU). initial runs were
with less than optimum ma ,.-hines, and current progress seems to
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be resolving the difficulties. There is one problem, however,
that is not yet resolved and that is the problem of hot restart.
The catalyst bad is so hot when the machine is stopped that it
will not restart properly unless the bed is cooled by being
purged with a gas such as nitrogen or helium. The purge system
was not considered vital, in the early stages of design and was
a weight tradeoff. The current mission profiles, particularly
abort situations, make hot restart desirable and methode of ac-
complishing this are being considered. A purge or other cooling
system may be necessary.
4.	 Propulsion
The Shuttle propulsion system consists of the three main
engines, the propellant tank, and the two solid rocket boosters
and interconnecting plumbing and wiring. Each of these com-
ponents has its own set of problems and will be discussed in
turn.
The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) is perhaps the most
obvious place where success-oriented planning may now be a prob-
iain. The time necessary to procure and/or modify turbopump
hardware is so long that should current problems persist,
schedules may have to slip. It is also apparent now that more
basic development work at the component level should have been
done. The original decisions were made by a number of people,
and the fact that in this case the troubles have exceeded the
norm should not be viewed as a breakdown of the system. In
fact, there are some bright sides to the SSME situation. A
high thrust, reusable throttleable engine has been built and
has accumulated a significant operating time. The control of
this engine by a computer operating in the engine environment
has been eminently successful and represents a major breakthrough
in engine control technology. The loads and speeds involved in
the turbomachinery may, now that we are having difficulty, re-
quire some basic support work to the empirical machine design.
It is the Panel's understanding that such activity, for instance,
in turbine blade structural design, is now being used. The Panel
is not comfortable with the current status of the SSME, but this
is a matter of caution. We see evidence to indicate that a safe,
serviceable engine can be made.; however, current problems may
impact schedules.
The propellant tank does not seem to have any major technical
problems. Fluid flow and POGO phenomena seem to be under control
and we feel that the matter of the tank's protuberances shedding
ice can be solved. The plumbing, while massive in size, does not
involve new technology and should present no critical problems.
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The solid rocket boosters represent an increase in sire
of an established technology that seems to be behaving as
predicted, we are monitoring this program, but feel that the
issues, if any, are matters of quality control and tailoring
rather than any significant new technical problems.
The recent investigation of a failure of a Delta vehicle
caused by a strap-on solid booster is being carefully monitored
by the Panel to make certain that any lesson learned there is
fed into the Shuttle SRH program.
A fourth element of the propulsion syatem is the orbital
maneuvering engine and small reaction control rockets. In the
Shuttle picture these components have a lower priority than,
for instance, the main engine. The Panel has just begu ►i to
look at these areas and has not formed conclusive opinions or
judgments at this time.
5. Avionics
The Avionics for the approach and landing test series un-
covered a few problem areas in computer management, beat did not
prevent a successful series of tests. The performance was in
fact good. The Avionics task for the orbital flight tests,
however, is much more complicated and extensive in that ascent,
orbit and descent all have to be accomplished. The new com-
puters with the double-density memories are a help, but current
demands are crowding this now capnbili.ty. This software load
must be closely monitored. The Panel feels that the Avionics
system will present no unmanageable problems, although the re-
dundancy management of the computers themselves must be thorough-
ly explored for failure modes that might shut down all computers.
6. Hazard Assessment
The subject of hazard assessment is not one of the Shuttle
subsystems, but is vital to the understanding of the risks associ-
ated with the Shuttle operations. The Panel has been interested
in this area for some time and has played a role in getting a more
complete involvement of the various program groups in the evalua-
tion of hazards, both individually and cumulatively. The Panel
has been investigating the need for an independent audit or review
of the Avionics system. We are concerned with the rapidity with
which t}:_ double-density memory capability was used up, and feel
that rigorous controls must be established.
7. Control of Human Error
The Panel has been concerned that the massive effort 1,IX, the
Shuttle program could be compromised by a relatively insignificant
fay=,ure on the part of a person who had either not been properly
trained or who had not been given due consideration in the man-
8
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machine interface. The solution to this problem takes the
form of training, checklists, and people-oriented design.
The Panel is concerned that this problem may be overlooked
in the press of the severe technical challenges that exist
in many parts of the program. When the "chips are dawn"
these pedestrian problems can be crucial and frustrating.
Another aspect of human error is the control of processes
where specifications are incomplete or, of necessity " impre-
ciao. 'rho resulting personal interpretation or inadvertent
deviation can be of major importance. The Panel in invastigat-
i.ng the control of this factor to evaluate its importance.
B.	 Payload Hazard Assessment
An area of concern to the panel and one it is now pursuing
Is that of the compatabilty from a risk point of view of the
Shuttle with its intended payloads. In any payload/Shuttle
interfaces the same rigorous design, test, and inspection pro-
cedures must be observed, and crew training, including simula-
tion " must be accomplished. It is important that the combina-
tion of Shuttle and payload be safe, but in addition, effective.
9.	 Launch ProRaration
A review of the orbital tests is incomplete without mention
of launch preparation and logistics. However, the Panel's at-
tention has to data been on the Shuttle itself rather than on
the launch operations. This has been an appropriate emphasis,
and the Panel is beginning to study the launch operation,
In summary, the Panel views the Shuttle program more philosophi-
cally than the program personnel; hence, when asked "What are the major
safety problems in the shuttle?" we tend to answer in a framework that
is different than that of a person or group involved in specific techni-
cal problems and their solutions. At the present time we feel that one
of the important safety considerations is the effect of the schedule
driving technical people to make "fixes" rather than to engineer the
solution to a problem.
Secondly, we are concerned that further cutbacks in testing may
jeopardize the verification of the capability of subsystems to meet the
demands placed upon them. This is particularly true of non-redundant
systems and software where extensive testing is the only way to explore
all the variations of input that might produce an improper output.
Allied to this is the concern that the computer and its new memory do
not have the capacity margin that was envisioned when the double-density
memory was designed.
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We also am concorned with the criteria for development of new
technology which requires both performance and long life in the initial
product. The normal atages of a development are to attain the perform-
ance and then, from experience, make the modifications to attain the
required life. in areas of new technology such as the main engine it
in difficult to achieve bath final life and initial performance in one
step.
The Panel views its role as bringing these questions to manage-
menu's attention rather than submitting specific solutions to a current
technical problem. We monitor then* problems as indicators of the
state of the developmeent # and we feed, that the program has responded
appropriately. This procedure will produce a safes and effective Shuttle
whose life will be verified by the flight teat program, but whose
schedule may be impacted if current problems do not respond in a timely
MAnraepr.
We should emphasize that in the presentation. to NASA of our com-
ments and independent poi it of view we are more than natisfiod with the
programmatic response and attention that senior NASA management gives
our opinions. The Panel's audit does contribute to a safe and effective
NASA program,
3d
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1977 PAWL 14EETINGS
January 14	 Status of Pro arations for ALT Pro ram - J. sC
Mission 0 !%rations
Mission rules and contingency plans, including
prov.Wons for emergency separation and jettison.
Handling of anomalies in terms of their proper
resolution and assesezent of impact on subsequent
flights.
Shuttle Carrier Aircraft
Remaining open items which when closed complete
certification of the aircraft for the ALT program.
Mated aerodynamics, performance and flight controls
as to their effect on structure and pilot control.
Orbiter
Potential impact of modifications deferred from
Palmdale to DFRC on the ;flight schedule for inert
Orbiter flights.
Results of CARR and remaining certification work for
the first all-up systems manned Orbiter flight. Diff-
erences between doing integrated tests at DFRC and
Palmdale.
April 13	 Status of Preparations fcr Manned Active Flies
in ALT	 - DFRC
Overview of inert captive flight test results.
This covered dynamics, performance, loads, sta-
bility and control and separation. The pu.-pose
was to assess whether results were as predicted
and to evaluate any anomalies.
Manufacturing and test status of the Orbiter.
This covered the remaining manufacturing and re-
test activities and the scope of the Delta inte-
grated checkout to assure the vehicle would be
ready for flight. Particular attention was given
to thn APU.
Review of the flight test program with the active
Orbiter to review the current objectives and the
associated mission and contingency planning.
t
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April 14	 Review of Detailed Inspection of Following
Areas	 Rockwell/Downey
The method by which systems certification for
the entire Orbiter is accomplished prior to
flight. This included APUs, hydraulic systems,
control system, main computers, backup computer
and control system # cockpit equipment, etc.
Exceptions to spec performance. This focused on
the significance of these exceptions as con-
straints on a safe mission.
Changes made to the Orbiter since it left Palm-
dale and the contractor's visibility and
control, over the checkout process by which the
newly installed equipment had been certified before
it was assembled.
July 18, 19	 Review of Results of Captive/Active Flights and - JSC
Work remaining before FAL
The objective as in the other inspections was
to assess the developing basis of confidence
for proceeding with the next series of flights,
the major risk involved and problems remaining to
be resolved. The agenda included the following.
Certification of the Orbiter for the aero-
dynamic load envelope based on captive/
active flights and analyses.
Orbiter subsystems, covering the performance
and anomalies of the APU and hydraulic system,
Avionics hardware and software and flight
control system during captive/active flights.
In addition, a review of the anomalies on the
remaining systems was conducted.
Remaining work on Orbiter subsystems, covering
modifications to bring the vehicle into config-
uration for the first free approach and landing
test, and a summary of certification status.
Major risks accepted for this series of flights,
including control of such hazards as the APU
hydrazine lea}: into the Orbiter as on the first
captive/active flight 1-A,.
October 11	 Review of Program Director's Policy and - Washington, D.C.
Plans for Orbital Flight Teet Program
Given the Panel's preoccupation with ALT
the review of the Program Director's policy
and plans for the orbital flight test pro-
gram provided the Panel a status report on
changes since their last review. In addition,
the Panel received an assessment of aeronautics
planning from the Associate Administrator for
Aeronautics and Space Technology.
October 12	 Annul Meeting	 - Washington, D. C.
This is described in the body of the annual
report and consisted of a presentation by
each Panel member on his assessment of his
area of responsibility.
December 14- :assessment of the Adequacy of the Overall - Rockwell/Downey
15	 Test Program for OV 102 for Orbital
Flight Test Program
This ,review was also to assess the accept-
ability of the plans to use the Structural
Test Article as the orbital vehicle. Par-
ticular attention was given to the program
changes since 1974 and the rationale for
their acceptability. The review, therefore,
covered the following:
Overview of certification-verification
plan for the Orbiter.
Combined element verification plan.
Structures development and qualification
testing.
Major ground test program covering the
description, objectives and rationale for
any changes in the main propulsion test
program, the mated vehicle ground vibra-
tion test and one-quarter scale tests.,
flight control hydraulics, laboratory
tests and the Avionics tests in the ADL
and SAIL laboratories. Attention also
was given to the OMS and RCS tests at
White Sands as well as the vibro-acoustics
tests.
i
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Rationale for the use of the Structural Test
Article as OV-99 orbital flight vehicle.
Simulated flight test plan on the integratedflight vehicle and software.
x
y4
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1977 FACT-FINDING MEETINGS
by
Individual Panel Members
January 21 Held meeting concerning flight control Rockwell/Downe!
systems and APU.
Vebruary 2 Held meeting with Mr. John F. Yardley, Washington, D.C.
Associate Administrator for Office of
$pace Flight regarding Shuttle program.
February 3 Attended Flight Readiness Review of DFRC
ALT flight.
February 22 Conducted review of Space Shuttle Main MSFC
Engine "Review item Discrepancy" (RID)
.^
status resulting from SSME Critical
Design Review conducted in October 1976.
February 23- Participated in Space Shuttle Level II JSC
25 Hazards Screening Hoard as contributing
member.
March 2 Witnessed captive ALT flight. DFRC
March 25 Participated in Center Management SSME MSFC
Quarterly Review, obtaining updated
engine status and NASA/Contractor
activities.
May 2-4 Participated in Hazards Screening Board JSC
to examine Orbiter 101 regarding up-
coming ALT p;;ogram.	 Reviewed subsystems
and particularly single point failure
concerns.
May 18 Attended ALT Flight Readiness Review. DFRC
June 1 Attended meeting with Rockwell personnel. Rockwell/Downey
concerning the APU, the hydraulic system
and ztatus of Avionics.
June 14 Attended Mission Readiness Review. DFRC
June 21 Attended meeting with NASA administra- Washington, D.C.
tion personnel.
June 28 Witnessed ALT flight. DFRC
July 7 Attended meeting with NASA Administrator Washington, D. C.
and Deputy Administrator, Drs. Frosch
and Lovelace.
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July 14 Attended administrative meeting at NASA Washington, D. C.
Headquarters.
July 17-18 Attended meeting for fact-finding on ARC
Thermal Protection System.
July 18 Held tev ew of specific concerns associ- Rocketdyne
ated with SSMR turbomachinery and the
engine test program.
July 27 Attended Mission Control conduct of an JSC
ALT flight.
July 29 Held administrative meeting with NASA Lockheed
Administrator and Deputy Administrator,
Drs. Frosch and Lovelace.
August 2 Attended meeting investigating hydrazine Rockwell/Downey
leek during captive flight.
August 2 Participated in Center Management Quarter- MSFC
ly Review, obtaining updated engine status
and NASA/Contractor activities.
August 8 Attended Flight Readiness and Technical DFRC
Readiness Reviews for active Space Shuttle
Orbiter.
August 24 Held discussions concerning methods used KSC
to control and check upon human error.
Modified inspection systems were described,
including Designated Verification.
August 26 Held meeting with General Accounting Office Lockheed
personnel concerning Shuttle's critical
elements.
August 30 Witnessed conduct of ALT flight. DFRC
August 31 Held administrative meeting with Assistant Washington, D. C.
Administrator for DOD and Interagency
Affairs and Panel staff.
September 9 Attended Entry Working Group meeting to JSC
review status of Shuttle aerodynamics
Characteristics with emphasis on flight
test results versus wind tunnel tests and
analysis based on ALT data.
September 13 Attended Mission Readiness Review and DFRC
observed second manned free flight.
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aSeptember 13 Held meeting concerning APU.
Septenber 26 Held discussions regarding Shuttle
problems.
October 4-6	 Examined the approach and methodology
used by NASA and its Contractors in
their risk assessment activities and
definition of aggregate risk for a
Shuttle mission.
October 5	 Held administrative meeting with
NASA Headquarters personnel.
Sunstrand
Rockwell
JSC
Washington, D.C.
October 5-7 Held discussions concerning Manufactur- Palmdale, Rockwell
ing Verification as applied by Rockwell
International and direct subcontractors
to control of htunan error.	 Application
to sub-tier contractors is dependent
upon paperwork control at this time.
October 25 Attended review of results of ALT flights. Rockwell/Downey
November 14 Attended review of ALT ferry considera- DFRC
tions.
November 29- Participated in SSME Quarterly Review MSFC
30 and conducted status review of Shuttle
External Tank and Solid Rocket Booster
programs.
November 30 Attended meeting of investigative board General Dynamics
concerning Atlas Centaur failure. Convair
December 2 Attended investigative meeting concerning. ARC.
payloads.
December 8-5 Attended administrative meetings; fact- Washington, D.C.
finding on payloads, Spacelab, aircraft
programs and Shuttle.
December 16 Attended meeting concerning payloads. ARC
December 20 Held administrative meetings with NASA Washington, D.C.
Administrator.
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